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ii

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

Priority No. 2

V
V•

MELVIN EUGENE SMITH,

Case No. 940580-CA

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1995) and possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person, a second-degree felony, in violation of § 76-10-503
(1995). This Court has jurisdiction over the matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994).
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does defendant's brief present sufficient legal argument and citation so as to
comply with rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure?
Because this is a question of appellate procedure there is no lower court ruling to
review. "When an appellant's argument contains no citations to the record and no legal
authority, and as such does not comply with the briefing rules, [the appellate court
should] decline to reach those issues." State v. Garza. 820 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah App.
1991).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
All relevant provisions will be reproduced within the argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 29, 1994, after a day-and-a-half trial, a jury convicted Melvin Eugene
Smith of aggravated burglary, a first-degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-203 (1995), and possession of a weapon by a restricted person, a second-degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1995) (R. 188). This same day
defendant filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the prosecution had failed to comply
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1995) (R. 154). On May 2, 1994, the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss (R. 179-183). The court later sentenced defendant to an
indeterminate five years to life term for the aggravated burglary conviction, and one-to
fifteen-years for the possession charge (R. 188). The trial judge ordered the sentences
to run concurrently (R. 187).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 16, 1994, Troy Thomas, an employee of the Albertsons' store located at
2255 North, University Parkway in Provo, saw defendant in an upstairs office (Tr. 52,
54, 59). When he went to the office to investigate, defendant drew a gun and told
Thomas to give him the money (Tr. 59-60). Soon thereafter another employee entered
the office and defendant ordered both her and Thomas to get down on the floor and
count to fifty while he left (R. 62). Several other employees and customers saw
2

defendant hastily leave the store and saw the license plate number of the car in which
he drove away (Tr. 93, 96, 108, 120, 127, 131, 135). Later that day the police
determined that the car was registered in the defendant's name (Tr. 163). After
learning this, the police assembled a photographic spread and showed it to three
witnesses (Preliminary Hearing, 73-74). Two of the witnesses identified defendant
from the photo line-up (id.). The next day, July 17, police arrested the defendant
(Preliminary Hearing, 75).
On October 18, 1993, defendant sent a petition for a 120-day disposition to the
Utah County Public Defenders Association (R. 181). The association wrote a letter to
June Hinckley, the Records and I.D. Officer at the Utah State Prison, on October 27,
1993, stating that it was forwarding the petition to her (id.). In response to the letter,
Ms. Hinckley sent a form notice to defendant on November 15, 1993, for purposes of
filing his 120-day request (id.) Defendant signed the form on November 18, 1993, and
Ms. Hinckley received it on December 7, 1993 (id.). She then sent a copy to the
prosecuting attorney, but not the court clerk (id.).
Defendant's original trial date was set for November 9, 1993 (R. 180). On
November 5, 1993, the prosecutor motioned the court to continue the trial because she
could not locate an essential witness (R. 180, 23, 21). In an affidavit to the court,
Sergeant Toby O'Bryant stated that the witness, who was in the car with the defendant
at the time of the incident, refused to speak to him under advice of defendant's counsel,
3

and that she informed him that she was in the process of moving (R. 20-21). Sergeant
O'Bryant made efforts to locate her, but was unable to find her in the vicinity of the
location to which she said she was moving (id.). Defendant objected to the motion for
continuance, but the court found good cause and continued the trial to February 7, 1994
(R. 180). On February 2, 1994, the prosecution again presented a motion for a
continuance because an essential witness would be out of the state (id.). The defendant
did not object to the continuance, but requested trial as soon as possible (R. 179-80).
The court found good cause and granted the continuance, moving the trial to March 28,
1994 (R. 179). The court noted that its calender was composed of criminal trials from
February 2, 1994 to March 28, 1994, and that there were no civil matters to bump,
thereby leaving March 28, 1994, the earliest date the trial could be rescheduled (R.
id.). On March 13, 1994, the prosecutor filed another motion for continuance because
the chief investigator was going to be out of town (R. 53). The court denied the motion
(R. 54).
The trial was held on March 28, 1994, 110 days after Ms. Hinckley received
official notice of defendant's petition for 120-day disposition on December 7, 1993 (R.
181).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should dismiss defendant's appeal because his brief does not comply
with rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
4

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE MEANINGFUL LEGAL
CITATION OR ANALYSIS RENDERS THIS COURT UNABLE TO
REVIEW ANY OF THE ISSUES WHICH HE ASSERTS ON THIS
APPEAL
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, expressly requires that a brief
include an argument containing "the contentions and reasons of the appellant with
respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts
of the record relied on." As a matter of settled appellate practice, failure to support
assertions of error with proper argument forecloses consideration on appeal. Utah R.
App. P. 24(j) (stating that briefs which are not in compliance with rule 24 may be
disregarded or stricken, on motion or sea sponte by the court); State v. Wareham. 772
P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (rejecting defense argument for lack of legal analysis); State
v. Amicone. 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (same); State v. Garza. 820 P.2d 937,
939 (Utah App. 1991) (holding appellate court would decline to examine issues that are
not supported by citations to the record or legal authority); State v. Reiners. 803 P.2d
1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990) (declining to rule on a sufficiency of the evidence
argument that contained "no citations to authority and only vague reasoning").
Defendant's first argument, that he was not prosecuted within 120 days as
required by section 77-29-1, contains only two citations to legal case authority and fails
to relate the significance of these cases to the facts of the current appeal. Br. Of
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Defendant at 6-7. Similarly, defendant offers only broad assertions and vague
reasoning as to whether good cause existed for a continuance of the trial and provides
no legal citations in support of his argument.1 Br. Of Defendant at 7. This omission is
fatal to the defendant's brief.
Defendant's second argument, ineffectiveness of trial counsel, also fails to
provide meaningful legal analysis or citation. Defendant cites only Strickland v.
Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), for the proposition that defendant's trial
counsel was ineffective. Yet, defendant makes no reference to the two-prong test
which Strickland established for ineffectiveness claims, i.e, that counsel's performance
fell below a standard of objective reasonableness and that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant. M, See also State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah App.
1994) (applying Strickland test). Instead, defendant offers only vague arguments as to
why trial counsel was ineffective and how this ineffectiveness prejudiced the defendant

1

Response to defendant's arguments takes a two-prong inquiry. If Dec. 7, 1993, is the
date considered operative for the 120 day notice, then only 110 days passed before defendant's trial
began on March 28, 1994, and the trial occurred within the appropriate time. If instead, October 27,
1993, the date Ms. Hinckley received notice from the Utah County Public Defender's Association, is
the operative date, then defendant must show why the trial court's determination of good cause for
granting a continuance was erroneous. This entails a showing that the trial court's finding of good
cause was an abuse of discretion. £g£ State v. Petersen. 810 P.2d 421, 424-25 (Utah 1991) (holding
that trial courts have discretion in finding good cause for a continuance in 120-day disposition case);
State v. Trujillo. 656 P.2d 403, 404 (Utah 1982) (stating discretion is vested in the trial court in these
matters); State v. Mathis. 319 P.2d 134, 136 (Utah 1957) (holding that a "request for a continuance is
addressed to the sound discretion of the trail court and unless there is plain abuse its ruling will not be
disturbed"). Defendant makes no argument as to why the trial court abused its discretion, nor even any
argument as to why there was not good cause for the continuance.

6

with no citation to any authority which would support his position. Br. of Defendant at
8-9.
Finally, defendant cites no cases or legal authority in support of his insufficiency
of the evidence argument. When attacking the sufficiency of the evidence a defendant
must first marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and must then show how
this evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. State v. ScheeL 823 P.2d 470,
472 (Utah App. 1991). Defendant fails to meet either of these requirements. In a case
presenting similar issues, State v. Reiners. 803 P.2d 1300, 1301 n.2 (Utah App. 1990),
this Court declined to rule on an insufficiency claim where no meaningful legal
argument or citation was made. Because defendant's arguments contain no meaningful
or significant citations to authority and only vague reasoning, his brief should be
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
This Court should dismiss defendant's appeal, because of dc^ndant's failure to
comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION NOT REQUESTED
The State does not request either oral argument or a published opinion.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 # W of July, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM

Assistant Attorney General
7
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM

A

Rule 24. Briefs.
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate
headings and in the order indicated:
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency whose judgment or
order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of the case on appeal contains the names
of all such parties. The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately
inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with parallel citations, rules,
statutes and other authorities cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court.
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: the standard of
appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial court.
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations whose interpretation
is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to the appeal shall be set out verbatim
with the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone
will suffice, and the provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case,
the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the facts relevant
to the issues presented for review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e)
of this rule.
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably paragraphed, shall be a
succinct condensation of the arguments actually made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a
mere repetition of the heading under which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant
with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought.
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary under this
paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless doing so makes the brief
unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound separately, the addendum shall contain a table of
contents. The addendum shall contain a copy of:
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central importance cited in the
brief but not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but not available to the court as part
of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the determination of
the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of fact and conclusions of law,
memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's oral decision, or the contract or document
subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the requirements of
paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not include:
(1) a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied with the
statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum of the appellant.
The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the appellee, and if the
(c) 1953-1995 By The Michie Company

ADDENDUM

B

810 P.2d421
(Cite as: 810 P.2d 421)

Page

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Bryon Dale PETERSEN, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 900180.
Supreme Court of Utal*.
April 4, 1991.
Defendant was convicted by jury of aggravated
burglary, and two counts of attempted seconddegree murder, before the Seventh District Court,
Emery County, Boyd Bunnell, J., and court
subsequently found defendant guilty of being
habitual offender.
Defendant appealed.
The
Supreme Court, Hall, C.J., held that reversal of
defendant's convictions was required due to failure
of State to bring defendant to trial within 120 days
of date of delivery of written notice of disposition,
and fact that there was no good cause for the delay.
Reversed, charges dismissed.
[1] CRIMINAL LAW <&=> 1134(3)
HOkl 134(3)
Questions of law are reviewed by the Supreme Court
for correctness.
[2] CRIMINAL LAW &=> 577.10(10)
110k577.10(10)
Defendant who files notice of disposition is not
required to object to trial date in order to maintain
his rights under statute requiring defendant to have
charge brought to trial within 120 days of date of
delivery of written notice of disposition.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3, 4).
[3] CRIMINAL LAW <©^ 577.10(4)
110k577.10(4)
Trial court's decision not to dismiss for failure to
begin proceeding within 120 days after filing of
notice of disposition and its decision to grant
continuance are based on findings of good cause,
and thus same standard of review should be applied.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
52(a).
[3] CRIMINAL LAW &=> 1134(3)
HOkl 134(3)
Trial court's decision not to dismiss for failure to

1

begin proceeding within 120 days after filing of
notice of disposition and its decision to grant
continuance are based on findings of good cause,
and thus same standard of review should be applied.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1(3, 4); Rules Civ.Proc, Rule
52(a).
[4] CRIMINAL LAW <S^ 1134(3)
HOkl 134(3)
Legal
determinations
concerning
proper
interpretation of statute which grants trial court
discretion are reviewed for correctness.
[5] CRIMINAL LAW <S=> 1158(1)
HOkl 158(1)
Trial court's factual determinations will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous.
[6] CRIMINAL LAW G=> 577.16(8)
110k577.16(8)
Defendants who are not brought to trial within 120
days of filing of notice of disposition have no
burden of proving that they were prejudiced by
delay or that prosecution was given tactical
advantage to be entitled to dismissal of charges.
U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1.
[7] CRIMINAL LAW <§=> 577.16(5.1)
110k577.16(5.1)
Formerly 110k5771/4(5)
There was no reasonable continuance granted to toll
statutory period for bringing of case to trial after
notice of disposition was filed; neither of the
attorneys nor defendant requested or was granted
continuance. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 77-29-1(3).
[8] CRIMINAL LAW <S=> 577.10(4)
110k577.10(4)
Good cause for failing to hold hearing within 120
days of inmate's filing of notice of disposition
cannot be based on mere fact that delay was not
caused by prosecutor. U.C.A.1953, 77-29-1, 7729-1(3, 4).
[9] CRIMINAL LAW <§=> 577.10(3)
110k577.10(3)
Delay in bringing inmate to trial within 120 days of
his filing of notice of disposition was not reasonable
for specific purpose of allowing defendant and his
counsel time to resolve their conflicts; trial judge
did not feel that delay was necessary to resolve
conflict 34 days before date of trial when
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defendant's counsel sought to withdraw due to
continuing conflict, but rather court appointed
cocounsel and did not continue trial. U.C.A.1953,
77-29-1,77-29-1(3,4).
•422 Keith H. Chiara, Price, and Allen S.
Thorpe, Castle Dale, for defendant and appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam, Dan R. Larsen, Salt Lake City,
for plaintiff and appellee.
HALL, Chief Justice:
Defendant Bryon Dale Petersen appeals his
convictions of aggravated burglary, [FN1] a first
degree felony; of two counts of attempted second
degree murder, [FN2] both second degree felonies;
[FN3] and of being a habitual criminal. [FN4]
FN1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203(1) (Supp.1989).
FN2. Utah
(Supp.1989).

Code

Ann.

§

76-5-203(1 )(a)

FN3. Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp.1989).

copy of the notice was found in the trial court's file.
FN5. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (Supp.1989).
On July 27, 1989, the Emery County Public
Defender was appointed to represent Petersen.
Petersen was arraigned on September 6, 1989, and
at the arraignment, requested that the court appoint
different
counsel
because
of
Petersen's
dissatisfaction with the public defender's handling of
his case. Petersen's request for new counsel was
denied, and without objection, trial was set for
February 15, 1990, 218 days after Petersen filed the
notice of disposition.
On January 5, 1990, Petersen's appointed counsel
sought to withdraw from the case, claiming that he
was not able to resolve continuing conflicts with his
client. On January 12, 1990, the trial judge denied
the motion to withdraw and appointed co-counsel.
When Petersen's new defense counsel learned that
Petersen had filed a notice of disposition, a motion
to dismiss was filed on the ground that Petersen was
not brought to trial within 120 days of the delivery
of the notice. On February 15, 1990, a hearing was
held and the motion to dismiss was denied.

FN4. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 (Supp.1989).
On July 6, 1989, Petersen was charged with
burglarizing the home of Ms. Lola Jewkes and
attempting to murder Ms. Jewkes and her daughter.
Petersen, having been previously convicted and
sentenced to prison for felony offenses, at least one
of which was a second degree felony, was also
charged with possession of a firearm by a prohibited
person [FN5] and with being a habitual criminal.
On July 12, 1989, Petersen, who was being held at
the Utah State Prison pending a parole revocation
hearing, filed a notice and request for disposition of
pending charges ("notice of disposition"), pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (Supp.1989). The
notice of disposition was filed with an authorized
agent of the Utah State Prison. Section 77-29-1(2)
requires that any custodial officer, upon receipt of a
notice of disposition, "shall immediately cause the
demand to be forwarded ... to the appropriate
prosecuting attorney and court clerk." Section 7729-1(1) states that a prisoner is "entitled to have the
charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date
of delivery of written notice." The Emery County
Attorney received a copy of the notice of
disposition. However, for unknown reasons, no

In dismissing the motion, the trial court found:
(1) The county attorney had received the notice of
disposition, but the court had received no notice
whatsoever. (2) The court asked Petersen whether
the trial date was acceptable, and Petersen did not
object to the date. (3) The trial date was set to
allow time for defendant and his counsel to resolve
their differences. (4) Petersen, as a result of having
his parole *423 revoked, has been incarcerated in
the Utah State Prison since the filing of the charges.
In its conclusions of law, the trial court ruled: (1)
The setting of the trial date for February 15, 1990,
occurred within the 120-day period and was for the
purpose of allowing time for Petersen and his
counsel to resolve their differences and, therefore,
constituted a continuance for good cause. (2)
Petersen waived the statutory right to a trial within
120 days by not objecting to the trial date. (3)
Petersen had the burden of showing that the failure
to try his case before the expiration of the statutory
period resulted in prejudice to his case or tactical
advantage to the prosecutor. (4) Petersen made no
showing of prejudice or tactical advantage. (5) The
delay was not caused by any action or inaction of
the prosecutor.

Copr. ° West 1995 No claim to orig. U.S. govt, works
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On February 15, 1990, the date of the trial,
Petersen moved to disqualify the trial judge on the
ground that the judge had previously, as a district
attorney, prosecuted defendant and had recused
himself from presiding over a trial of defendant in
December of 1981. The court denied this motion on
the ground that it was not timely made.
The aggravated burglary charge and the two
attempted murder charges were tried to a jury on
February 15 and 16. The jury returned a verdict of
guilty on all counts.
Following the verdict,
defendant waived a jury trial on the charge of being
a habitual criminal. The court subsequently found
defendant guilty of this charge. The charge of
unauthorized possession of a handgun was
dismissed.
Petersen was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not less than five years nor
more than life on each one of the four charges, such
terms to run consecutively.
There are three issues presented on appeal. First,
Petersen claims that all his convictions should be
reversed and all charges dismissed with prejudice
due to the State's failure to bring him to trial within
120 days of the date on which the notice of
disposition was delivered to the county attorney.
Second, Petersen claims that if this court does not
dismiss the charges, he is entitled to a new trial on
the grounds of bias and prejudice on the part of the
trial judge. Third, the State, on its own motion,
asserts that Petersen was improperly sentenced and
asks that the case be remanded for resentencing.
[FN6]
FN6. See State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368, 1374
(Utah 1989); State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 1071,
1074 (Utah 1989); State v. Stilling, 770 P.2d 137,
144-45 (Utah 1989) (all holding that the habitual
criminal statute does not create a separate crime but
operates as an enhancing statute); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (Supp.1989) (second
degree murder is a first degree felony); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-4-102 (Supp.1989) (attempted second
degree murder is a second degree felony); Utah
Code Ann. § 76-3-203(2) (Supp.1989) (second
degree felony is punishable by an indeterminate
period of not less than one nor more than fifteen
years).

Petersen's claim that his convictions should be
reversed and the charges against him dismissed with
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prejudice is based on section 77-29-1, [FN7] which
reads in pertinent part:
FN7. Petersen does not claim that his constitutional
rights to a speedy trial were violated. See U.S.
Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I, § 12. The
right afforded by the Utah Constitution is also
guaranteed by Utah Code Ann. § 77-l-6(l)(f)
(Supp.1989).

(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of
imprisonment in the state prison ... and there is
pending against the prisoner in this state any
untried indictment or information, and the
prisoner shall cause to be delivered to the warden
... or any appropriate agent of the same, a written
demand specifying the nature of the charge and
the court wherein it is pending and requesting
disposition of the charge, he shall be entitled to
have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of
the date of delivery of written notice.
(3) After written demand is delivered as required
in Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the
defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being
present, may be granted any reasonable
continuance.
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial
within 120 days, or within *424 such continuance
as has been granted, and the defendant or his
counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court
shall review the proceeding. If the court finds
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have
the matter heard within the time required is not
supported by gooc cause, whether a previous
motion for continuance was made or not, the court
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice.
[1] The threshold issue, in determining whether
Petersen's convictions should be reversed pursuant
to section 77-29-1, is whether the trial court erred in
ruling that Petersen waived his rights under the
statute by not objecting to the trial date. Whether
criminal defendants, after filing notices of
disposition, are required to affirmatively assert their
rights under section 77-29-1 is a question of
statutory construction and, therefore, a question of
law. Questions of law are reviewed for correctness.
[FN8]
FN8. E.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771
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P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (statutory construction
is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness); Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754
P.2d 933, 934 (Utah 1988) (statutory construction is
a question of law, which is reviewed for
correctness).
[2] This court has held that criminal defendants
have no such duty to object under Utah Code Ann.
§§ 77-65-1 to -2 (Supp.1953) (amended 1980), the
predecessor to section 77-29-1. [FN9]
In so
holding, we stated, "[I]t is apparent that the
legislature intended to place the burden of
complying with the statute, on the prosecutor."
[FN 10] The language in section 77-29-1 compels
the same conclusion. Section 77-29-1(4) states, "If
the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting
attorney to have the matter heard within the time
required is not supported by good cause ... the court
shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice."
[FN 11] This language clearly places the burden of
complying with the statute on the prosecutor.
Therefore, Petersen, after filing his notice of
disposition, was not required to object to the trial
date in order to maintain his rights under section 7729-1.
FN9. State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453 P.2d
158, 160 (1969).
FN10. Id.
FN11. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1(4) (emphasis
added).
[3] Since Petersen did not waive his rights, the
determination of whether his convictions should be
reversed is dependent on whether, in accordance
with section 77-29-1(3), a "reasonable continuance"
was granted for "good cause shown" or whether, in
accordance with section 77-29-1(4), the trial judge
properly found that the "failure of the prosecuting
attorney to have the matter heard within the time
required is supported by good cause."
Before
reaching these questions, however, it is important to
note that we have interpreted both section 77-29-1
and its predecessor as granting discretion to the trial
court. [FN12] Specifically, in State v. Bonny
[FN13] we held that sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953)
(amended 1980) granted trial courts the authority to
make reasonable determinations concerning the
existence of good cause.
Copr.

c

FN12. State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah
1982) (per curiam) (interpreting section 77-29-1);
State v. Bonny, 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147,
147-48 (1970) (interpreting section 77-65-1).
FN13. 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970).
"[F]or a good cause shown in open court ... the
court having jurisdiction in the matter may grant
any necessary or reasonable continuance." The
emphasized language of the statute just quoted
makes it clear that if there is a reasonable basis in
the record to support the proposition that the trial
court granted a continuance "for good cause
shown" it was within [the trial court's] discretion
and authority to do so. [FN14]
FN14. Id., 477 P.2d at 147-48 (emphasis in
original).
In stating this standard of review, the court relied
on language that is consonant with the language of
section 77-29-1(3); accordingly, the same standard
should apply to the present statute. Although the
predecessor to section 77-29-1 did not have a
provision parallel to section 77-29-1(4), the decision
not to dismiss under section *425 77-29-1(4) is
based on a finding of "good cause," as is the
decision to grant a continuance under section 77-291(3). Therefore, the same standard of review should
be applied to both subsections 77-29-1(3) and (4).
[FN15]
FN15. See State v. Trujillo, 656 P.2d at 405.
[4] [5] Before reviewing the record to determine if
there is a reasonable basis for the trial court's
judgment, however, it is necessary to make primary
determinations concerning the content of the record.
It is to be noted that trial courts do not have
discretion to misapply the law. [FN 16] Therefore,
legal determinations concerning the proper
interpretation of the statute which grants the trial
court discretion are reviewed for correctness.
[FN 17] Similarly, the trial court's factual
determinations will not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous. [FN 18] It is only after these primary
determinations are made that the record can be
reviewed for the existence of a reasonable basis for
the proposition that good cause existed for the
continuance or the delay.
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FN16. See 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 772
(1962); 4 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 111 (1957).

his burden of showing prejudice, therefore, cannot
be used to support the finding of good cause.

FN 17. See Hancock v. Planned Development
Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) (trial court
does not have discretion to grant new trial absent
one of the grounds specified in the rule); Tangaro
v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 373 P.2d 390, 391 n.
2 (1964) (trial court does not have discretion to
grant new trial absent one of the grounds specified
in the rule); 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 772
(1962) (trial court has no discretion to misapply the
law); 4 CJ.S. Appeal and Error § 111 (1957) (trial
court has no discretion on question of own power);
see also, e.g., Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771
P.2d 1033, 1038 (Utah 1989) (statutory construction
is a question of law which is reviewed for
correctness); Forbes v. St. Mark's Hosp., 754 P.2d
933, 934 (Utah 1988) (statutory construction is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness).
See generally State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453
P.2d 158, 160 (1969) (supreme court interprets
sections 77-65-1 to -2 (1953) (amended 1980) and
grants no deference to trial court's ruling).

FN19. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325, 1327-31
(Utah 1986).

FN18. See Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a); Sweeney Land
Co. v. Kimball, 786 P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990).
[6] The record supports the trial court's factual
findings. In its conclusions of law, however, the
trial court erred in rulings concerning the correct
interpretation and application of section 77-29-1.
Specifically, the trial court ruled that under section
77-29-1, Petersen had the burden of proving that the
delay prejudiced his case or gave the prosecution a
tactical advantage. Although the fact that the delay
works to the disadvantage of a defendant may be a
reason for not finding "good cause," nothing in
section 77-29-1, its predecessor, or any of the case
law under either statute requires a showing of
prejudice in order for the charges against a
defendant to be dismissed. On the contrary, section
77-29-1 clearly provides that if there is not good
cause for the delay, the court shall order the matter
dismissed. The statute makes no mention of the
effect of the delay. The only support the State cites
for the trial court's position is a case dealing with
the constitutional right to a speedy trial. [FN 19]
However, we have never used the same approach in
cases decided under section 77-29-1 or its
predecessor as we have used in constitutional cases.
[FN20] The conclusion that Petersen did not carry

FN20. See State v. Clark, 28 Utah 2d 272, 501
P.2d 274, 276 (1972) (rights under section 77-65-2
(amended 1980) are distinct from constitutional
rights to speedy trial).
[7] It is also to be noted that the trial court erred
in ruling that a reasonable continuance was granted
tolling the statutory period. Section 77-29-1(3) sets
out requirements that must be met before trial
judges, in their discretion, may grant continuances
that toll the time in which a defendant must be tried
under section 77-29-1. This section provides that
"the prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his
counsel ... may be granted any reasonable
continuance.M It is clear from the record that neither
of the attorneys nor defendant requested or was
granted a continuance. The requirements of the
statute not being *426 met, the trial court erred in
concluding that a continuance was granted under
section 77-29-1(3).
This fact, however, is not fatal to State's case.
Section 77-29-1(4) states that if a motion to dismiss
is brought, the trial court shall review the
proceedings. "If the court finds that the failure of
the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard
within the time required is not supported by good
cause, whether a previous motion for continuance
was made or not, the court shall order the matter
dismissed with prejudice." This language makes it
clear that it is the finding of good cause that is
dispositive and not the actual granting of a
continuance. The court did find that there was good
cause for the delay in that the trial was set to allow
time for defendant and his counsel to resolve their
differences. The finding of good cause is also
supported by the court's conclusion that the delay
was not caused by an action or inaction of the
prosecutor.
[8] As the State points out, this court has upheld
trial court findings of good cause that were
supported, at least in part, by the fact that the delay
was not caused by action or inaction of the
prosecutor. [FN21] However, this factor alone has
never been considered dispositive. In the past, we
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have reversed a trial court's decision not to dismiss,
notwithstanding the fact that the delay was not
caused by the prosecutor. [FN22] Furthermore, in
the cases cited by the State, there are other reasons
for the finding of good cause, such as a request on
the part of the defense for a continuance [FN23]
and/or a relatively short delay caused by unforeseen
problems arising immediately prior to trial. [FN24]
In any event, to hold that good cause is supported
by the lone fact that the delay was not caused by the
prosecutor would contradict the language in section
77-29-1(4) which places the burden of complying
with the statute on the prosecution.
FN21. See State v. Sailings, 709 P.2d 348, 349
(Utah 1985) (concerning the Interstate Agreement
on Detainers Act, Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-5
(Supp.1984)); State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d 753, 756
(Utah 1985), State v. Trujillo, 656 P 2d 403, 405
(Utah 1982) (per curiam), State v. Velasquez, 641
P.2d 115, 116 (Utah 1982).
FN22. See State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361, 453
P.2d 158, 159-60 (1969). Although Wilson was
decided under the previous statute, as noted above
the standard for allowing a case to be tried beyond
the required time, good cause, is the same under
both statutes.
FN23 State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d at 349; State v.
Bullock, 699 P.2d at 756; State v. Velasquez, 641
P.2dat 116.
FN24 State v. Bullock, 699 P.2d at 756; State v.
Trujillo, 656 P.2d at 405.
[9] It is necessary, therefore, to examine the trial
court's conclusion that the delay was reasonable
because it was for the specific purpose of allowing
defendant and his counsel time to resolve their
conflicts. In some circumstances, conflicts between
defendants and their counsel may justify delay. It is
to be noted, however, that in the instant case the
trial court became aware of the problems 57 days
after the notice of disposition was filed. Arguably,
this problem could have been resolved within the
time allotted by the statute. Indeed, a review of the
record makes it clear that the trial judge did not feel
that such a delay was necessary. When Petersen's
counsel, due to continuing conflicts, sought to
withdraw 34 days prior to trial, the court denied the
motion, appointed co-counsel, and did not continue

the trial. In the order appointing co-counsel, the
court stated that it did "not wish to delay the trial
because of any such conflict." Since a delay was not
necessary to resolve the conflict 34 days before the
date of trial, a fortiori, a delay was not necessary to
resolve the conflict approximately 63 days before
the running of the statutory period. [FN25]
FN25. The statute requires that a defendant be tried
within 120 days of the time the notice is delivered,
not filed. See § 77-29-1(1); see also State v.
Taylor, 538 P.2d 310, 312-13 (Utah 1975) (dealing
with section 77-65-2). Since the record does not
reveal when the notice of disposition was delivered
to the county attorney, it is impossible to determine
the exact date the statutory period ran. However,
nothing in the record indicates that the notice of
disposition was not delivered within a reasonable
time as required by the statute. See § 77-29-1(2),
see also State v Taylor, 538 P.2d at 312-13
•427 It should also be noted that there was a long
delay inasmuch as the trial date was set for 218 days
beyond the time defendant filed the notice of
disposition. Given the fact that the record reveals
that the trial court felt the delay was unnecessary,
such a long delay cannot be considered reasonable.
The conclusion that the delay was for the purpose of
allowing time for defendant and his counsel to
resolve their conflicts, therefore, cannot be used to
support a reasonable basis for the finding of good
cause.
The State contends that in State v. Bullock,
[FN26] this court upheld a finding of good cause
under similar facts. Bullock, however, is easily
distinguishable from the instant case. First, in
Bullock the defense counsel moved for a
continuance because he was ill on the date of trial.
[FN27] In the instant case, there was no motion for
a continuance and the conflict did not arise shortly
before trial. Second, in Bullock the continuance
only delayed the trial 13 days beyond the original
trial date. [FN28] In the instant case, the trial was
delayed over 90 days from the running of the
statutory period. A review of the proceeding,
therefore, does not reveal a reasonable basis for the
finding of good cause. Accordingly, pursuant to
section 77-29-1, Petersen's convictions should be
reversed and the charges against him dismissed with
prejudice.
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FN26. 699 P.2d 753 (Utah 1985).
FN27. Id. at 756.
FN28. Id. In Bullock, there was no record of the
delivery of the notice of disposition. Therefore, it
is impossible to determine how much time passed
between the delivery of the notice and the trial.
Due to our holding regarding section 77-29-1, we
do not reach the other issues in the case. However,
we feel compelled to again comment on the
propriety of trial judges' presiding over criminal
trials when they have previously prosecuted the
defendants. In State v. Neeley, [FN29] a case that
also dealt with a judge who presided over a trial of a
defendant whom he had previously prosecuted, we
stated:
FN29. 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988).
[A] judge should recuse himself when his
"impartiality" might reasonably be questioned.
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct 3(C)(1)(b) (1981).
This standard set forth by the Code of Judicial
Conduct should be given careful consideration by
the trial judge. It may require recusal in instances
where no actual bias is shown.... [T]he integrity
of the judicial system should be protected against
any taint of suspicion.... [W]e recommend the
practice that a judge recuse himself where there is
a colorable claim of bias or prejudice.... [FN30]
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when motions to disqualify are filed the day of trial
and stress that we are not deciding the issue of
whether the requirements of rule 29 must be
complied with under such circumstances. However,
because the motion to disqualify was summarily
dismissed, we are without a record sufficient to
enable us to determine whether the affidavit was
filed "as soon as practical" and "in good faith" as
required by rule 29(c). It is also to be observed
that, assuming the trial judge was aware of his prior
contact with Petersen, the problem could have been
avoided had the judge followed our recommendation
in Neeley and, *428 on his own motion, recused
himself due to the colorable claim of prejudice.
Pursuant to our holding regarding section 77-291, the convictions are reversed and the charges are
dismissed with prejudice.
HOWE, A.C.J., and STEWART, DURHAM and
ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.
END OF DOCUMENT

FN30. Id. at 1094 (emphasis in original).
We went on to hold that although judges should
recuse themselves if there are colorable claims of
bias or prejudice, absent a showing of actual bias,
"failure to do so does not constitute reversible error
as long as the requirements of section 77-35-29
[current version at Utah R.Crim.P. 29] have been
met." [FN31]
FN31. Id. at 1094-95.
The instant case, however, is more troubling than
Neeley. In this case, the trial judge, upon receiving
the affidavit alleging prejudice, did not have a
second judge rule on the legal sufficiency of the
affidavit as required by rule 29(d), but summarily
dismissed the motion on the ground that it was
untimely. We are aware of the problems that arise
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